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Abstract. Security properties are often focused on the technological
side of the system. One implicitly assumes that the users will behave in
the right way to preserve the property at hand. In real life, this cannot
be taken for granted. In particular, security mechanisms that are difficult
and costly to use are often ignored by the users, and do not really defend
the system against possible attacks.
Here, we propose a graded notion of security based on the complexity of
the user’s strategic behavior. More precisely, we suggest that the level
to which a security property ϕ is satisfied can be defined in terms of (a)
the complexity of the strategy that the voter needs to execute to make
ϕ true, and (b) the resources that the user must employ on the way. The
simpler and cheaper to obtain ϕ, the higher the degree of security.
We demonstrate how the idea works in a case study based on an electronic
voting scenario. To this end, we model the vVote implementation of the
Preˆt a` Voter voting protocol for coercion-resistant and voter-verifiable
elections. Then, we identify “natural” strategies for the voter to obtain
receipt-freeness, and measure the voter’s effort that they require. We also
look at how hard it is for the coercer to compromise the election through
a randomization attack.
Keywords: electronic voting, coercion resistance, natural strategies,
multi-agent models, graded security
1 Introduction
Security analysis often focuses on the technological side of the system. It im-
plicitly assumes that the users will duly follow the sequence of steps that the
designer of the protocol prescribed for them. However, such behavior of human
participants seldom happens in real life. In particular, mechanisms that are dif-
ficult and costly to use are often ignored by the users, even if they are there to
defend those very users from possible attacks.
For example, protocols for electronic voting are usually expected to satisfy
receipt-freeness (the voter should be given no certificate that can be used to break
the anonymity of her vote) and the related property of coercion-resistance (the
voter should be able to deceive the potential coercer and cast her vote in accor-
dance with her preferences) [7, 26, 17, 27]. More recently, significant progress has
been made in the development of voting systems that would be coercion-resistant
and at the same time voter-verifiable, i.e., would allow the voter to verify her part
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of the election outcome [31, 12]. The idea is to partly “crowdsource” an audit
of the election to the voters, and see if they detect any irregularities. Examples
include the Preˆt a` Voter protocol [32] and its implementation vVote [13] that
was used in the 2014 election in the Australian state of Victoria.
However, the fact that a voting system includes a mechanism for voter-
verifiability does not immediately imply that it is more secure and trustworthy.
This crucially depends on how many voters will actually verify their ballots [37],
which in turn depends on how understandable and easy to use the mechanism
is. The same applies to mechanisms for coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness,
and in fact to any optional security mechanism. If the users find the mechanism
complicated and tiresome, and they can avoid it, they will avoid it.
Thus, the right question is often not if but how much security is obtained
by the given mechanism. In this paper, we propose a graded notion of practical
security based on the complexity of the strategic behavior, expected from the
user if a given security property is to be achieved. More precisely, we suggest
that the level to which property ϕ is “practically” satisfied can be defined in
terms of (a) the complexity of the strategy that the user needs to execute to
make ϕ true, and (b) the resources that the user must employ on the way. The
simpler and cheaper to obtain ϕ, the higher the degree of security.
Obviously, the devil is in the detail. It often works best when a general idea
is developed with concrete examples in mind. Here, we do the first step, and
look how the level of coercion-resistance and voter-verifiability can be assessed
in vVote and Preˆt a` Voter. To this end, we come up with a multi-agent model
of vVote, inspired by interpreted systems [18]. We consider three main types
of agents participating in the voting process: the election system, a voter, and
a potential coercer. Then, we identify strategies for the voter to use the voter-
verifiability mechanism, and estimate the voter’s effort that they require. We also
look at how difficult it is for the coercer to compromise the election through a
randomization attack [26]. The strategic reasoning and its complexity is formal-
ized by means of so called natural strategies, proposed in [24, 25] and consistent
with psychological evidence on how humans use symbolic concepts [8, 19].
To create the models, we use the Uppaal model checker for distributed and
multi-agent systems [4], with its flexible modeling language and intuitive GUI.
This additionally allows to use the Uppaal verification functionality and check
that our natural strategies indeed obtain the goals for which they are proposed.
Related work. Formal analysis of security that takes a more human-centered
approach has been done in a number of papers, for example with respect to
insider threats [21]. A more systematic approach, based on the idea of secu-
rity ceremonies, was proposed and used in [10, 5, 6, 29], and applied to formal
analysis of voting protocols [28]. Here, we build on different modeling tradition,
namely on the framework of multi-agent systems. This modeling approach was
only used in [22] where a preliminary verification of the Selene voting protocol
was conducted. Moreover, to our best knowledge, the idea of measuring the se-
curity level by the complexity of strategies needed to preserve a given security
requirement is entirely new.
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Fig. 1. Voter model
Other (somewhat) related works include social-technical modeling of attacks
with timed automata [15] and especially game-theoretic analysis of voting pro-
cedures [9, 14, 2, 23]. Also, strategies for human users to obtain simple security
requirements were investigated in [3]. Finally, specification of coercion-resistance
and receipt-freeness in logics of strategic ability was attempted in [36].
2 Methodology
The main goal of this paper is to propose a framework for analyzing security
and usability of voting protocols, based on how easy it is for the participants to
use the functionality of the protocol and avoid a breach of security. Dually, we
can also look at how difficult it is for the attacker to compromise the system. In
this section we explain the methodology.
2.1 Modeling the Voting Process
The first step is to divide the description of the protocol into loosely coupled
components, called agents. The partition is often straightforward: in our case, it
will include the voter, the election infrastructure, the teller etc.
For each agent we define its local model, which consists of locations (i.e.,
the local states of the agent) and labeled edges between locations (i.e., local
transitions). A transition corresponds to an action performed by the agent. An
example model of the voter can be seen in Figure 1. When the voter has scanned
her ballot and is in the state scanning she can perform action enter vote, thus
moving to the state voted. This model, as well as the others, has been created
using the modeling interface of the Uppaal model checker [4]. The locations
in Uppaal are graphically represented as circles, with initial locations marked
by a double circle. The edges are annotated by colored labels: guards (green),
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synchronizations (teal) and updates (blue). The syntax of expressions is like that
of C/C++. Guards enable the transition if and only if the guard condition eval-
uates to true. Synchronizations allow processes to synchronize over a common
channel. Update expressions are evaluated when the transition is taken.
The global model of the whole system consists of a set of concurrent processes,
i.e., local models of the agents. The combination of the local models unfolds into
a global model, where each global state represents a possible configuration of
the local states of the agents.
2.2 Natural Strategic Ability
Many relevant properties of multi-agent systems refer to strategic abilities of
agents and their groups. For example, voter-verifiability can be understood as
the ability of the voter to check if her vote was registered and tallied correctly.
Similarly, receipt-freeness can be understood as the inability of the coercer, typi-
cally with help from the voter, to obtain evidence of how the voter has voted [36].
Logics of strategic reasoning, such as ATL and Strategy Logic, provide neat
languages to express properties of agents’ behavior and its dynamics, driven by
individual and collective goals of the agents [1, 11, 30]. For example, the ATL
formula 〈〈cust〉〉F ticket may be used to express that the customer cust can en-
sure that he will eventually obtain a ticket, regardless of the actions of the other
agents. Semantically, the specification holds if cust has a strategy whose ev-
ery execution path satisfies ticket at some point in the future. Strategies in a
multi-agent system are understood as conditional plans, and play central role
in reasoning about purposeful agents [1, 35]. Formally, strategies are defined as
functions from states to actions. However, real-life processes often have millions
or even billions of possible states, which allows for terribly complicated strategies
– and humans are notoriously bad at handling combinatorially complex objects.
To better model the way human agents strategize, the authors of [24, 25]
proposed to use a more human-friendly representation of strategies, based on
lists of condition-action rules. The conditions are given by Boolean formulas.
Moreover, it was postulated that only those strategies should be considered
whose complexity does not exceed a given bound. This is consistent with classical
approaches to commonsense reasoning [16] and planning [20], as well as the
empirical results on how humans learn and use concepts [8, 19].
Natural strategies. Let B(Propa) be the set of Boolean formulas over atomic
propositions Propa observable by agent a. In our case, Propa consists of all the
references to the local variables of agent a, as well as the global variables in the
model. We represent natural strategies of agent a by lists of guarded actions,
i.e., sequences of pairs φi  αi such that: (1) φi ∈ B(Propa), and (2) αi is an
action available to agent a in every state where φi holds. Moreover, we assume
that the last pair on the list is ⊤  α for some action α, i.e., the last rule is
guarded by a condition that will always be satisfied. A collective natural strategy
for a group of agents A = {a1, . . . , a|A|} is a tuple of individual natural strategies
sA = (sa1 , . . . , sa|A|). The set of such strategies is denoted by ΣA.
Natural Strategic Abilities in Voting Protocols 5
The “outcome” function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths (i.e., all max-
imal traces) that occur when coalition A executes strategy sA from state q
onward, and the agents outside A are free to act in an arbitrary way.
Complexity of strategies. We will use the following complexity metric for
strategies: compl (sA) =
∑
(φ,α)∈sA
|φ|, with |φ| being the number of symbols in
φ, without parentheses. That is, compl (sA) simply counts the total length of
guards in sA. Intuitively, the complexity of a strategy is understood as its level
of sophistication. It corresponds to the mental effort needed to come up with
the strategy, memorize it, and execute it.
2.3 Specification of Properties Based on Natural Strategies
To reason about natural strategic ability, the logic NatATL was introduced in [24,
25] with the following syntax:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉≤kX ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉≤kF ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉≤kG ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉≤kϕU ϕ.
where A is a group of agents and k ∈ N is a complexity bound. Intuitively,
〈〈A〉〉≤kγ reads as “coalition A has a collective strategy of size less or equal than
k to enforce the property γ.” The formulas of NatATL make use of classical
temporal operators: “X ” (“in the next state”), “G ” (“always from now on”),
“F ” (“now or sometime in the future”), and U (strong “until”). For example, the
formula 〈〈cust〉〉≤10F ticket expresses that the customer can obtain a ticket by a
strategy of complexity at most 10. This seems more appropriate as a functionality
requirement than to require the existence of any function from states to actions.
The path quantifier “for all paths” can be defined as Aγ ≡ 〈〈∅〉〉≤0γ.
We will use NatATL to specify requirements on the voting system. For ex-
ample, voter-verifiability captures the ability of the voter to verify her vote after
the election. In our case, this is represented by the check4 phase, hence we can
specify voter-verifiability with the formula 〈〈voter〉〉≤kF (check4 ok ∨ error). The
intuition is simple: the voter has a strategy of size at most k to successfully
perform check4 or else signal an error. A careful reader can spot one prob-
lem with the formalization: it holds if the voter can signal an error regard-
less of the outcome of the check (and it shouldn’t!). A better specification is
given by 〈〈voter〉〉≤kF (check4 ok∨check4 fail). Moreover, we can use the formula
AG (check4 fail → 〈〈voter〉〉≤kF error) to capture dispute resolution.
The conceptual structure of receipt-freeness is different. In that case, we want
to say that the voter has no way of proving how she has voted, and that the
coercer (or a potential vote-buyer) does not have a strategy that allows him to
learn the value of the vote. Crucially, this refers to the knowledge of the coercer.
To capture the requirement, we need to extend NatATL with knowledge oper-
ators Ka, with Kaϕ expressing that agent a knows that ϕ holds. For instance,
Kcoercvotedi says that the coercer knows that the voter has voted for the candi-
date i. Then, receipt-freeness can be formalized as∧
i∈Cand ¬〈〈coerc, voter〉〉
≤kG (end → (Kcoercvotedi ∨Kcoerc¬votedi)).
That means that the coercer and the voter have no strategy with complexity at
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most k to learn, after the election is finished, whether the voter has voted for i or
not. Note that this is only one of the possible formalization of the requirement.
For example, one may argue that, to violate receipt-freeness, it suffices that the
coercer can detect whenever the voter has not obeyed ; he does not have to learn
the exact value of her vote. This can be captured by the following formula:∧
i∈Cand ¬〈〈coerc, voter〉〉
≤kG ((end ∧ ¬votedi)→ Kcoerc¬votedi).
2.4 Using Verification Tools to Facilitate Analysis
The focus of this work is on modeling and specification; the formal analysis is
done mainly by hand. However, having the models specified in Uppaal suggests
that we can also benefit from its model checking functionality. Unfortunately,
the requirement specification language of Uppaal is very limited, and allows
for neither strategic operators nor knowledge modalities. Still, we can use it to
verify concrete strategies if we carefully modify the input formula and the model.
We will show how to do it in Section 6.
3 Use Case Scenario: vVote
Secure and verifiable voting is becoming more and more important for the democ-
racy to function correctly. In this paper, we analyze the vVote implementation
of Preˆt a` Voter which was used for remote voting and voting of handicapped
persons in the Victorian elections in November 2014 [13]. The main idea of the
Preˆt a` Voter protocol focuses on encoding the vote using a randomized candidate
list. In this protocol the ballot consists of two parts: the randomized order of
candidates (left part) and the list of empty checkboxes along with the number
encoding the order of the candidates (right part). The voter cast her vote in an
usual way, by placing a cross in the right hand column against the candidate of
her choice. After that she tears the ballot in two parts, destroys the left part,
cast the right one and takes the copy of it as her receipt. After the election her
vote appears on the Web Bulletin Board as the pair of the encoding number
and the marked box, which can be compared with the receipt for verification.
We look at the whole process, from the voter entering the polling station, to the
verification of her vote on the public Web Bulletin Board (WBB).
After entering the polling station, the Poll Worker (PW) authenticates the
voter (using the method prescribed by the appropriate regulations), and sends a
print request to the Print On Demand (PON) device specifying the district/re-
gion of the voter. If the authentication is valid (state printing) then the PON
retrieves and prints an appropriate ballot for the voter, including a Serial Num-
ber (SN) and the district, with a signature from the Private Web Bulletin Board
(PWBB). The PWBB is a robust secure database which receives messages, per-
forms basic validity checks, and returns signatures. After that, the voter may
choose to check and confirm the ballot. This involves demanding a proof that
the ballot is properly formed, i.e., that the permuted candidate list corresponds
correctly to the cipher-texts on the public WBB for that serial number. The
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check4_fail
error
check4_okcheck4_2check4_1check4
check4
check_preferencescheck_serial check4
raise_error
raise_errorraise_error
Fig. 2. Voter refinement: phase check4
WBB is an authenticated public broadcast channel with memory. If the ballot
has a confirmation check, the voter returns to the printing step for a new ballot
(transition from state check1 to printing).
Having obtained and possibly checked her ballot (state has ballot), the voter
can scan it by showing the ballot bar code to the Electronic Ballot Marker
(EBM). Then, she enters her vote (state scanning) via the EBM interface. The
EBM prints on a separate sheet the voters receipt with the following information:
(i) the electoral district, (ii) the Serial Number, (iii) the voter’s vote permuted
appropriately to match the Preˆt a` Voter ballot, and (iv) a QR code with this
data and the PWBB signature.
Further, the voter must check the printed vote against the printed candidate
list. In particular, she checks that the district is correct and the Serial Number
matches the one on the ballot form. If all is well done, she can optionally check
the PWBB signature, which covers only the data visible to the voter. Note
that, if either check2 or check3 fails, the vote is canceled using the cancellation
protocol. If everything is OK, the voter validates the vote, shreds the candidate
list, and leaves the polling station. Finally, the voter can check her vote on the
WBB after the election closes. She only needs to check the SR and the order of
her preference numbers.
4 Models
In this section we present models of a simplified version of vVote, focusing on
the steps that are important from the voter’s perspective. We use Uppaal as the
modeling tool because of its flexible modeling language and user-friendly GUI.
4.1 Voter Model
The model already presented in Figure 1 captures the voter actions from en-
tering the polling station to casting her vote, going back home and verifying
her receipt on the web bulletin board. As shown in the model, some actions,
i.e. additional checks, are optional for the voter. Furthermore, to simulate the
human behavior we added some additional actions, not described in the protocol
itself. For example the voter can skip even obligatory steps, like check2. This
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Fig. 3. Serial number check
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Fig. 4. Preferences order check
is especially important, as check2 may be the most time-consuming action for
the voter and many voters may skip it in the real life. After every check, the
voter can signal an error, thus ending up in the error state. The state represents
communication with the election authority, signaling that the voter could not
cast her vote or a machine malfunction was detected.
4.2 Refinements of the Voter Model
The model shown in Figure 1 is relatively abstract. For example, check4 is shown
as an atomic action, but in fact it requires that the voter compares data from
the receipt and the WBB. In order to properly measure the complexity of the
voter strategies, it is crucial to consider different levels of granularity.
Check4 phase. Recall that this is the last phase in the protocol and it is
optional. Here, the voter can check that the printed receipt matches her intended
vote on the WBB. This includes checking that the serial numbers match (action
check serial), and that the printed preferences order match the one displayed on
the WBB (action check preferences). So, if both steps succeed, then the voter
reach state check4 ok. The whole model for this phase is presented in Figure 2.
Other phases, like check2 can be presented in a similar way.
Serial number phase. In some cases the model shown in Figure 2 may still
be too general. Depending on the length of the serial number we can have dif-
ferent levels of difficulty. For example comparing two alphanumeric sequences of
length 2 is easier then comparing such sequences of length 10. To express this
concept, we split this step into atomic actions: check serial1(i) for checking the
ith symbol on the WBB, and check serial2(i) for checking the ith symbol on
the receipt. The resulting model is shown in Figure 3, where n is the length of
the serial number.
Preferences order phase. Similarly to comparing the two serial numbers,
verifying the printed preferences can also be troublesome for the voter. In or-
der to make sure that her receipt matches the entry on the WBB, the voter
must check each number showing her preference. Actions check number1(i) and
check number2(i) mean checking number on the WBB and on the receipt, re-
spectively. This is shown on the model in Figure 4, where m is the number of
candidates in the ballot.
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Fig. 9. Electronic Ballot Marker (EBM)
4.3 Voting Infrastructure
The voter is not the only entity taking part in the election procedure. The
election infrastructure and the electronic devices associated with it constitute a
significant part of the procedure. Since there are several components involved in
the voting process, we decided to model each component as a separate agent.
The models of the Public WBB, Private WBB, the cancel station, the print-on-
demand printer, and the EBM are shown in Figures 5–9.
4.4 Coercer Model
To model the coercer, we first need to determine his exact capabilities. Is he
able to interact with the voter, or only with the system? Should he have full
control over the network, like the Dolev-Yao attacker, or do we want the agent
to represent implicit coercion, where the relatives or subordinates are forced to
vote for the specified candidate. There are many possibilities, and to this end
we have decided that one model for the Coercer agent is not enough. Because of
that and due to lack of space, we omit the details, and only describe the possible
actions of the coercer:
• Coerce(v, ca): the coercer coerces the voter v to vote for his candidate ca;
• ModifyBallot(v, ca): the coercer modifies the ballot for v by setting ca;
• RequestV ote(v): the coercer requests a vote from v;
• Punish(v): the coercer punishes v;
• Infect: the coercer infects the voting machine with malicious code;
• Listen(v): the coercer listens to the vote of v from the voting machine;
• Replace(v, ca): the coercer replaces the vote of v with ca.
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Some of the actions may depend on each other. For example, Listen and
Replace actions should be executed only after the Infect action has succeed, as
the Coercer needs some kind of access to the voting machine.
5 Strategies and Their Complexity
There are many possible objectives for the participants of a voting procedure.
A voter’s goal could be to just cast her vote, another one could be to make sure
that her vote was correctly counted, and yet another one to verify the election
results. The same goes for the coercer: he may just want to make his family vote
in the “correct,” or to change the outcome of the election. In order to define
different objectives, we can use formulas of NatATL and look for appropriate
natural strategies, as described in Section 2. More precisely, we can fix a subset of
the participants and their objective with a formula of NatATL, find the smallest
strategy that achieves the objective, and compute its size. The size of the strategy
will be an indication of how hard it is to make sure that the objective is achieved.
An example of specification that the voter wants to achieve is the veri-
fiability of her vote. Given the model in Figure 1, we can use the formula
〈〈v〉〉≤kFcheck4 ok to check whether the voter has a natural strategy of size less
or equal than k to verify that her receipt has the same information displayed in
the public WBB. If we want to check only if the voter has a natural strategy
to verify her receipt, i.e. we want also consider the case in which the voter’s
receipt and the information in the public WBB are different, we can consider
the formula 〈〈v〉〉≤kF(check4 ok ∨ check4 fail) as we discussed in Section 2.3.
Note that it is essential to fix the granularity level of the modeling right.
When shifting the level of abstraction, we obtain significantly different “mea-
surements” of strategic complexity. This is why we proposed several variants of
the voter model in Section 4. In this section, we will show how it affects the
outcome of the analysis.
In the following we take another look at the previously defined models and
try to list possible strategies for the participants.
5.1 Strategies for the Voter
In this section we focus on natural strategies for voter-verifiability. Given the
model in Figure 1, we can analyze an example of natural strategy that can be
used by the voter to achieve the end of the voting procedure, i.e., to satisfy the
NatATL formula ϕ1 = 〈〈v〉〉
≤kFend. Clearly, ϕ1 specifies the fact that the voter
has a natural strategy of size less or equal than k (captured by 〈〈v〉〉≤k) to reach
sooner or later (captured by the eventually operator F) the end of procedure
(i.e. the state labeled with atom end).
Natural Strategy 1 A strategy for the voter is:
1. has ballot scan ballot
2. scanning enter vote
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3. voted check2
4. check2 ok ∨ check2 fail ∨ out move next
5. vote ok shred ballot
6. shred leave
7. check4 check4
8. check4 ok ∨ check4 fail finish
9. ⊤ ⋆
Recall that the above is an ordered sequence of guarded commands. The first
condition (guard) that evaluates to true determines the action of the voter. Thus,
if the voter has the ballot and she has not scanned it (proposition has ballot),
she scans the ballot. If has ballot is false and scanning is true then she enters her
vote, and so on. If all the preconditions except ⊤ are false, then she executes
an arbitrary available action (represented by the wildcard ⋆). For example, the
voter will do print ballot at the state printing, where the voter needs to wait
while the Pool Walker identifies her and generates a new ballot.
In Natural Strategy 1, we have 9 guarded commands in which the command
(4) costs 5 since in its condition there are five symbols (three atoms plus two
disjunctions), the command (7) costs 3 since in its condition there are three
symbols (two atoms plus the disjunction), while the other guarded commands
cost 1, so the total complexity is 1 · 7 + 3 · 1 + 5 · 1 = 15. So, the formula ϕ1 is
true with any k of 15 or more. Further, by Natural Strategy 1, starting from the
state has ballot, the voter needs of 9 steps to achieve the state end.
Note that Natural Strategy 1 can be also used to demonstrate that the for-
mula ψ = 〈〈v〉〉≤kF(check4 ok∨check4 fail) holds. In that case, we can reduce the
size of the strategy by removing the guarded command (8). Thus, ψ is satisfied
even for k ≥ 12.
For completeness, in what follows, we show a natural strategy with the ad-
ditional guarded commands in case the voter wants to do the optional phases
check1 and check3, i.e., we want to satisfy the formula ϕ2 = 〈〈v〉〉≤kF(checked1∧
checked3 ∧ end). In particular, ϕ2 checks whether there exist a natural strat-
egy for the voter such that sooner or later she does check1, check3, and ends
the whole voting process. Note that, apart from the standard propositions like
check1, we also add their persistent version like checked1, i.e., once it gets true,
it remains always true.
Natural Strategy 2 A strategy for the voter that considers the optional phases
check1 and check3 is:
1. has ballot ∧ counter == 0 check1
2. has ballot scan ballot
3. scanning enter vote
4. voted check2
5. check2 ok ∨ check2 fail check3
6. check1 ∨ check3 ∨ out move next
7. vote ok shred ballot
8. shred leave
12 Wojciech Jamroga, Damian Kurpiewski, and Vadim Malvone
9. check4 check4
10. check4 ok ∨ check4 fail finish
11. ⊤ ⋆
In Natural Strategy 2, we introduce the verification of check1 and check3.
To do this we add two new guarded commands (5) and (6), and we update (1)
by adding a control on a counter to determine if check1 is done or not. Here, we
have a total complexity of 1 · 7+ 3 · 3 + 5 · 1 = 21. So, the formula ϕ2 is true for
any k ≥ 21. Further, by Natural Strategy 2, starting from the state has ballot,
the voter needs of 13 steps to achieve the state end.
An important aspect to evaluate in this subject concerns the detailed analysis
of check4. Some interesting questions on this analysis could be: how does the
voter perform check4? How does she compare the printed preferences with the
information in the public WWB? These questions open up several scenarios both
from a strategic point of view and from the model to be used. From a strategic
point of view, we could consider a refinement of Natural Strategy 1, in which
the action check4 is evaluated as something of atomic. If we consider that the
check4 includes: comparing preferences with the information in the public WWB
and checking the serial number, we can already divide the single action into two
different actions for each of the checks to be performed. So, given the model in
Figure 2, we can refine the natural strategy for the voter, as follows.
Natural Strategy 3 A strategy for the voter that refines check4 is:
1. has ballot scan ballot
2. scanning enter vote
3. voted check2
4. check2 ok ∨ check2 fail ∨ out move next
5. vote ok shred ballot
6. shred leave
7. check4 check serial
8. check4 1 check preferences
9. check4 2 check4
10. check4 ok ∨ check4 fail finish
11. ⊤ ⋆
In Natural Strategy 3, we have 11 guarded commands in which all the con-
ditions are defined with a single atom but (4) in which there is a disjunction of
three atoms and (10) in which there is a disjunction of two atoms. So, the total
complexity is 1 · 9 + 3 · 1 + 5 · 1 = 17.
To verify that the voter does each step of check4, we need to provide a formula
that verifies atoms check4, check4 1, and check4 2. To do this in NatATL, we
use the formula ϕ3 = 〈〈v〉〉≤kF(checked4 ∧ checked4 1 ∧ checked4 2). Note that
ϕ3 is true for any k ≥ 17; one can use Natural Strategy 3 to demonstrate that.
In addition, to increase the level of detail, one could consider that the voter
checks the preferences and the serial number one by one in an ordered fashion.
So, given the models in Figures 3 and 4, we can consider a formula that checks
whether the voter has a strategy that satisfies the following properties:
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1. sooner or later she enters in the check4 phase;
2. she verifies a symbols of the SN in the public WBB and in her receipt;
3. she does (2) until the last symbol of the serial number is verified;
4. she does a similar approach as in (2)-(3) for the verification of preferences;
5. she finishes the whole procedure.
This can be captured by the formula ϕ4 = 〈〈v〉〉
≤kF(checked4∧wbb checked sn∧
receipt checked sn∧checked4 1∧wbb checked pr∧receipt checked pr∧checked4 2).
So, we can define a natural strategy that satisfies ϕ4, as follows.
Natural Strategy 4 A strategy for the voter that still refines check4 is:
1. has ballot scan ballot
2. scanning enter vote
3. voted check2
4. vote ok shred ballot
5. shred leave
6. out∨check2 ok∨check2 fail∨receipt check sn∨receipt check pr move next
7. check4 check serial1
8. wbb check sn check serial2
9. receipt check sn ∧ i == n end first
10. check4 1 check number1
11. wbb check pr check number2
12. receipt check pr ∧ j == m end second
13. check4 2 check4
14. check4 ok ∨ check4 fail finish
15. ⊤ ⋆
To conclude, the above natural strategy has 15 guarded commands in which
the conditions in (9), (12), and (14) are conjunctions of two atoms, the condition
in (6) is a disjunction of five atoms, and all the other conditions are defined with
a single atom. Therefore, the complexity of Natural Strategy 4 is 1·11+3·3+9·1 =
29. So, the formula ϕ4 is true with k ≥ 29.
5.2 Counting Other Kinds of Resources
So far, we have measured the effort of the voter by how complex strategies she
must execute. This helps to estimate the mental difficulty related, e.g., to voter-
verifiability. However, this is not the only source of effort that the voter has to
invest. Verifying one’s vote might require money (for example, if the voter needs
to buy special software or a dedicated device), computational power, and, most
of all, time. Here, we briefly concentrate on the latter factor.
For a voter’s task expressed by the NatATL formula 〈〈v〉〉≤kF ϕ and a natural
strategy sv for the voter, we can estimate the time spent on the task by the
number of transitions necessary to reach ϕ. That is, we take all the paths in
out(q, sv), where q is the initial state of the procedure. On each path, ϕ must
occur at some point. We look for the path where the first occurrence of ϕ happens
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latest, and count the number of steps to ϕ on that path. We will demonstrate
how it works on the last two strategies from Section 5.1.
For Natural Strategy 3, starting from the starting state, the voter needs of
9+2 = 11 steps to achieve check4∧wbb check sn∧ receipt check sn∧ check4 1∧
wbb check pr∧ receipt check pr ∧ check4 2. More precisely, 9 steps are needed to
achieve check4 in the local model shown in Figure 1, and 2 more steps to reach
check4 2 in the refinement of the final section of the procedure (see Figure 2).
For Natural Strategy 4, the calculation is slightly more complicated. Starting
from state start, the voter needs of 9+ ((2 ·n)+1)+((2 ·m)+1) steps to achieve
her goals, where n and m are the sizes of the serial number and the list of
preferences, respectively. In particular, 9 steps are needed to achieve check4 in
Figure 1, then ((2 · n) + 1) steps to achieve check4 1 in Figure 3, and finally
((2 ·m) + 1) steps to achieve check4 2 in Figure 4.
5.3 Strategies for the Coercer
For the coercer, we can start the analysis by considering the basic setting in
which he requests the vote and if the voter does not give him the ballot or the
vote is different with the one imposed by him, then he punish the voter. This
reasoning is captured by the following natural strategy.
1. ¬coercedv  Coerce(v, ca)
2. coercedv ∧ ¬requestedv  RequestV ote(v)
3. coercedv ∧ requestedv ∧ ¬punishedv ∧ (cav 6= ca ∨ not showv) Punish(v)
The total complexity of the above natural strategy is 16 since (1) has 2
symbols (atom + negation), (2) has 4 symbols (two atoms + conjunction +
negation), and (3) has 10 symbols (five atoms + three conjunctions + negation
+ disjunction).
Another intervention of the coercer regards the possibility to infect one or
more machines and to replace the vote of a voter.
1. ¬infected Infect
2. infected ∧ ¬replacedv  Replace(v, ca)
In this case the complexity is 6 since we have three atoms involved, two
negations, and a conjunction.
We can extend the above by considering that the coercer can infect the
machine and then can coerce the voter. So, if the coercer see a different vote on
the machine he can punish the voter. Note that this setting is interesting in the
case the coercer has infected a machine that only displays informations without
having the power to modify the vote.
1. ¬infected Infect
2. ¬coercedv  Coerce(v, ca)
3. infected ∧ listenv 6= ca Punish(v)
In the above, the complexity is 7, where (1) and (2) have complexity 2 and
(3) has complexity 3.
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6 Automated Verification of Strategies
In this section we explain how the model checking functionality of Uppaal can
be used for an automated verification of the strategies presented in Section 5.
To verify selected formulas and the corresponding natural strategies, we need to
modify several things: (i) the formula, (ii) the natural strategy and finally, (iii)
the model. We start by explaining the required modifications step by step.
Formula. To specify the required properties for the protocol, we have used a
variant of strategic logic, as it is one of the most suited logic to specify properties
for agents in an intuitive way. However, Uppaal does not support NatATL, so
the formula needs to be modified accordingly. In the formula we replace the
strategic operator 〈〈A〉〉≤k with an universal path quantifier A. For example, we
can consider the formula ϕ1 used in Section 5. In this context, we produce the
CTL formula ϕ′1 = AFend.
Natural Strategy. The natural strategy needs to be modified so that all the
guard conditions are mutually exclusive. To this end, we go through the precondi-
tions from top to bottom, and refine them by adding the negated preconditions
from all the previous guarded commands. For example, Natural Strategy 1 is
modified as follows:
1. has ballot scan ballot
2. ¬has ballot ∧ scanning enter vote
3. ¬has ballot ∧ ¬scanning ∧ voted check2
4. ¬has ballot∧¬scanning∧¬voted∧(check2 ok∨check2 fail∨out) move next
5. ¬has ballot∧¬scanning∧¬voted∧¬(check2 ok∨check2 fail∨out)∧vote ok 
shred ballot
6. ¬has ballot∧¬scanning∧¬voted∧¬(check2 ok∨check2 fail∨out)∧¬vote ok∧
shred leave
7. ¬has ballot∧¬scanning∧¬voted∧¬(check2 ok∨check2 fail∨out)∧¬vote ok∧
¬shred ∧ (check4 ok ∨ check4 fail) finish
8. ⊤ ⋆
Model. To verify the selected strategy, we fix it in the model by adding the
preconditions of the guards to the preconditions of the corresponding local tran-
sitions in the voter’s model. Thus, we effectively remove all transitions that are
not in accordance with the strategy. This way, only the paths that are consistent
with the strategy will be considered by the model-checker.
Levels of granularity. As we showed in Section 4, it is often important to
have variants of the model for different levels of abstraction. To handle those
in Uppaal, we have used synchronizations edges. For example, to have a more
detailed version of the phase check4, we added synchronization edges in the voter
model (Figure 1) and in the check4 model (Figure 2). Then, when going through
the check4 phase in the voter model, Uppaal will proceed to the more detailed
model and come back after getting to its final state.
Running the verification.We have modified the models, formulas, and strate-
gies from Sections 4 and 5 following the above steps. Then, we used Uppaal to
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verify that Natural Strategies 1–4 indeed enforce the prescribed properties. The
tool reported that each formula holds in the corresponding model. The execution
time was always at most a few seconds.
7 Conclusions
In the analysis of a voting protocols it is important to make sure that the voter
has a strategy to use the functionality of the protocol. That is, she has a strategy
to fill in and cast her ballot, verify her vote on the bulletin board, etc. However,
this is not enough: it is also essential to see how hard that strategy is. In this
paper, we propose a methodology that can be used to this end. One can assume
a natural representation of the voter’s strategy, and to measure its complexity
as the size of the representation.
We mainly focus on one aspect of the voter’s effort, namely the mental effort
needed to produce, memorize, and execute the required actions. We also indi-
cate that there are other important factors, like the time needed to execute the
strategy or the financial cost of the strategy. This may lead to tradeoffs where
optimizing the costs with respect to one resource leads to higher costs in terms of
another resource. Moreover, resources can vary in their importance for different
agents. For example, time may be more important for the voter, while money
more relevant when we analyze the strategy of the coercer. We leave a closer
study of such tradeoffs for future work.
Another interesting extension would be to further analyze the parts of the
protocol where the voter compares two numbers, tables, etc. As the voter is a
human being, it is natural for her to make a mistake. Furthermore, the proba-
bility of making a mistake at each step can be added to the model to analyze
the overall probability of successfully comparing two data sets by the voter.
Finally, we point out that the methodology proposed in this paper can be
applied outside the e-voting domain. For example, one can use it to study the
usability of policies for social distancing in the current epidemic situation, and
whether they are likely to obtain the expected results.
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